98,454 research outputs found

    Risk-transfer militarism, small massacres and the historic legitimacy of war

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    The perception of initial success in the `war against terrorism' appears to strengthen a general relegitimation of war in Western society that has been gathering pace over the last two decades. This article considers the war in Afghanistan as the latest example of the new Western way of war, and analyses its casualties compared with previous campaigns in the Gulf and Kosovo. It identifies the new type as `risk-transfer war', a central feature of which is a `militarism of small massacres'. This new type thus offers only a partial answer to the problems, for the legitimacy of warfare, caused by the systematic targeting of civilians in earlier `degenerate war'. Despite a closer approximation to `just war' criteria, inequalities of risk between Western military personnel and civilians in the zone of war revive the question of legitimacy in a new form. The article suggests that in our concern for relatively small numbers of civilian casualties, we may be applying to war those standards from which it has historically been exempt. In this context the contradictions of the new Western way of war reinforce a `historical pacifist' position towards the legitimacy of warfare

    To the Last Canadian?: Casualties in the 21st Army Group

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    In Normandy, Canadian infantry divisions suffered a higher rate of casualties than British divisions engaged in similar operations. These figures have been used by some historians to prove Canadian failure on the battlefield. However, by using statistics gathered by operational research scientists during the war, this article shows that the “considerably heavier casualties” suffered by the Canadians in Normandy and beyond were the product of a greater number of days in close combat with the enemy, not evidence of operational inexperience or tactical failure

    On War: The Dynamics of Vicious Civilizations

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    The dynamics of ``vicious'', continuously growing civilizations (domains), which engage in ``war'' whenever two domains meet, is investigated. In the war event, the smaller domain is annihilated, while the larger domain is reduced in size by a fraction \e of the casualties of the loser. Here \e quantifies the fairness of the war, with \e=1 corresponding to a fair war with equal casualties on both side, and \e=0 corresponding to a completely unfair war where the winner suffers no casualties. In the heterogeneous version of the model, evolution begins from a specified initial distribution of domains, while in the homogeneous system, there is a continuous and spatially uniform input of point domains, in addition to the growth and warfare. For the heterogeneous case, the rate equations are derived and solved, and comparisons with numerical simulations are made. An exact solution is also derived for the case of equal size domains in one dimension. The heterogeneous system is found to coarsen, with the typical cluster size growing linearly in time tt and the number density of domains decreases as 1/t1/t. For the homogeneous system, two different long-time behaviors arise as a function of \e. When 1/2<\e\leq 1 (relatively fair wars), a steady state arises which is characterized by egalitarian competition between domains of comparable size. In the limiting case of \e=1, rate equations which simultaneously account for the distribution of domains and that of the intervening gaps are derived and solved. The steady state is characterized by domains whose age is typically much larger than their size. When 0\leq\e<1/2 (unfair wars), a few ``superpowers'' ultimately dominate. Simulations indicate that this coarsening process is characterized by power-law temporal behavior, with non-universalComment: 43 pages, plain TeX, 12 figures included, gzipped and uuencode

    Year After Surge, NH Sees No Light at End of Iraq Tunnel 8/13/2008

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    One year after the ‚ÄĂșsurge‚ÄĂč by U.S. troops in Iraq, and despite a decrease in American and Iraqi casualties, New Hampshire residents are strongly opposed to the war and are pessimistic about U.S. chances of eventual victory

    Wars, presidents and popularity: The political cost(s) of war re-examined

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    Extensive research demonstrates that war casualties depress incumbent popularity. The present study argues that analyses of the political costs of warfare should also account for the financial toll of wars since a) financial costs of wars are substantial, b) these costs are publicly observed and understood and c) fiscal policy affects incumbents' approval ratings. Empirical evidence based on US data for the 1948-2008 period supports this theoretical claim: pecuniary costs of warfare either directly affect presidential popularity (e.g., in the Korean War) or their inclusion affects the predicted political cost of war casualties (e.g., in the Korean and Iraq/Afghanistan Wars). Interestingly, the adverse effect of war-spending is strongest under favourable economic conditions (i.e. low unemployment). -- Umfangreiche Forschungen zeigen, dass Kriegsopfer der PopularitĂ€t des Amtsinhabers schaden. Die vorliegende Studie liefert Argumente dafĂŒr, dass Analysen der politischen Kosten der KriegsfĂŒhrung in die Berechnung der finanziellen Kriegsausgaben miteinbezogen werden sollten, da a) die finanziellen Kosten von Kriegen betrĂ€chtlich sind, b) diese Kosten von der Öffentlichkeit wahrgenommen und verstanden werden, c) Fiskalpolitik die Umfragewerte des Amtsinhabers beeinflusst. Basierend auf US-Daten ĂŒber den Zeitraum 1948-2008 wird dieser theoretische Anspruch empirisch unterstĂŒtzt: pekuniĂ€re Kosten der KriegsfĂŒhrung haben entweder direkt eine Auswirkung auf die PopularitĂ€t des PrĂ€sidenten (z. B. Koreakrieg) oder deren Einbeziehung beeinflusst die vorhergesagten politischen Kosten durch Kriegsopfer (z. B. Korea- und Irak/-Afghanistankrieg). Interessanterweise sind die negativen Auswirkungen der Kriegsausgaben am stĂ€rksten, wenn die wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen gĂŒnstig (d.h. niedrige Arbeitslosigkeit) sind.Presidential approval,War,Casualties,Military spending

    Uplifting manhood to wonderful heights? News coverage of the human costs of military conflict from world war I to Gulf war Two

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    Domestic political support is an important factor constraining the use of American military power around the world. Although the dynamics of war support are thought to reflect a cost-benefit calculus, with costs represented by numbers of friendly war deaths, no previous study has examined how information about friendly, enemy, and civilian casualties is routinely presented to domestic audiences. This paper establishes a baseline measure of historical casualty reporting by examining New York Times coverage of five major wars that occurred over the past century. Despite important between-war differences in the scale of casualties, the use of conscription, the type of warfare, and the use of censorship, the frequency of casualty reporting and the framing of casualty reports has remained fairly consistent over the past 100 years. Casualties are rarely mentioned in American war coverage. When casualties are reported, it is often in ways that minimize or downplay the human costs of war

    Acute military psychiatric casualties from the war in Iraq

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    Background: The view that most military personnel evacuated from war zones are suffering from combat stress reactions, or are otherwise traumatised by the horrors of war, has an impact on all aspects of military psychiatry. Aims: To delineate the reasons for psychiatric aeromedical evacuation from Iraq from the start of build-up of UK forces in January 2003 until the end of October that year, 6 months after the end of formal hostilities. Method: A retrospective study was conducted of field and in-patient psychiatric assessments of 116 military personnel evacuated to the UK military psychiatric in-patient facility in Catterick Garrison. Results: Evacuees were mainly non-combatants (69%). A significant proportion were in reserve service (21%) and had a history of contact with mental health services (37%). Only 3% had a combat stress reaction. In over 85% of cases evacuation was for low mood attributed to separation from friends or family, or difficulties adjusting to the environment. Conclusions: These findings have implications especially for screening for suitability for deployment, and for understanding any longer-term mental health problems arising in veterans from Iraq

    Did the Iraq war have a body bag effect?

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    Did mounting troop casualties during the Iraq War tum the American public against the conflict? Analyzing public opinion data from over 400 public polls during the first six years of the war, this article attempts to identify whether there was a "body bag effect" in play. We create a multivariate model that tests a number of potential hypotheses including cumulative and marginal troop casualty as well as death milestone effects. We find that cumulative casualties provide a better explanation for the decline in public support than marginal casualties during the Iraq War. Contrary to the findings from the Korean and Vietnam Wars, this holds true during both periods of escalation and de-escalation

    “Truly they died that we might be free”: Remembering the Westlake Brothers

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    This article examines Canada’s Second World War memory through the experiences of the Westlake family of Toronto. George, Albert and Thomas Westlake were killed in action in Normandy, within a period of four days. Their story is fascinating in terms of the representation of Canadian war casualties of the Second World War. In addition, the article sheds light on one family and how it remembers and has acted to prevent the fading of memory. The Westlake family has ensured that George, Albert and Thomas are honoured and will be remembered. Examining this family provides a new perspective on the Second World War and its lasting impact
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